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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the largest groups of purported nonclients to whom law-
yers might have obligations are members of bargaining units repre-
sented by unions.1 Despite the much publicized decline of labor
unions, they have almost 16.4 million members.2 In addition, many
workers are members of bargaining units represented by labor unions,
but are not union members.3 The relationship of union lawyers to
1. James Pope has noted that "[u]nion lawyers alone rival corporate lawyers in their
impact on client cdnstituents. Although shareholders outnumber union members, the lat-
ter are far more dependent on their organizations." James G. Pope, Two Faces, Two Ethics:
Labor Union Lawyers and the Emerging Doctrine of Entity Ethics, 68 OR. L. REV. 1, 3
(1989).
2. Id. at 3 n.8 ("Union membership totalled 16,975,000 in 1986.") (citing STATISTI-
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 402 (1988)); C.D. GIFFORD, DIRECTORY OF LA-
BOR ORGANIZATIONS 5 (1996).
3. The provisions determining whether bargaining unit members are union members
vary according to the provisions of collective bargaining agreements and relevant law. Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) permits a union and an em-
ployer to negotiate a contract requiring union membership as a condition of employment.
These provisions are commonly referred to as union security clauses and fall into three
general categories: (1) a union shop which requires that an employee become a union
member usually after 30 days of employment; (2) an agency shop under which employees
do not have to join the union but instead pay service fees; and (3) maintenance of member-
ship where each employee who is a union member on the effective date of the contract
must remain a member, but the initial decision to join is voluntary. BRUCE FELDACKER,
LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 302, 303 (3d ed. 1990). Although these types of union
security clauses refer to "union membership," the Supreme Court has held that an em-
ployee cannot actually be required to become a union member. Only a "financial core"
membership, under which an employee pays the union's initiation fees and dues without
actually becoming a member, can be required under a union security clause. Id. If a finan-
cial core member objects to paying the full initiation fees and dues, the employee can be
required to pay only that portion of fees and dues used for collective bargaining functions.
Id. at 323. These financial core members are still covered by the collective bargaining
agreement and have full contractual rights, but are not entitled to participate in the union.
1096
UNION LAWYER'S OBLIGATIONS
these millions of bargaining unit members, whether members of the
union or not, is unclear.
An examination of how this relationship influences and is influ-
enced by labor law offers a fascinating case study of the synergy be-
tween the substantive law and the law and ethics of lawyering.' The
substantive labor law, which has legitimized representation of a union
as an entity, both promotes collective action on the part of unions and
protects the individual rights of bargaining unit members. The union's
duty of fair representation calibrates these sometimes conflicting
obligations.
These conflicting obligations owed to the organizational client
and to the individual bargaining unit member complicate the law and
ethics of union representation. In the context of grievances arising
under collective bargaining agreements,5 courts and commentators
have employed three different and inconsistent paradigms to describe
the relationship.6 They have variously described the union lawyer's
client as: the union; both the union and the bargaining unit member;
and the union as the primary client with the bargaining unit member
as a derivative client.7
Examination of the interplay between substantive labor law and
legal ethics suggests that at least in this context the substantive law
and legal ethics are intertwined. Just as labor law's conception of the
role of the union and rights of the bargaining unit member influences
the determination of the appropriate legal ethics model, legal ethics'
construction of the lawyer's obligation to the union and bargaining
unit member influences how we characterize the role of the union and
the rights of the bargaining unit member.
This case study suggests re-examination of the current practice of
analyzing substantive law and legal ethics as separate and uncon-
nected fields. The current practice is to view substantive law and legal
For example, only full union members can vote on the ratification of collective bargaining
agreements. Id. at 302. In addition, federal law permits states to limit or prohibit union
security provisions. II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1495 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d
ed. 1992). A number of state statutes, called "right-to-work" laws, prohibit the payment of
union dues or fees as a condition of employment, including even an agency shop arrange-
ment. Id. at 1531. In these jurisdictions, a bargaining unit member need have no union
affiliation. As a result of this panoply of potential contractual and legal provisions, bar-
gaining units represented by unions will often include employees who are not union mem-
bers or who are financial core members, and thus, members in name only.
4. I will sometimes refer to the law and ethics of lawyering using the shorthand ex-
pressions of "legal ethics" or "the law of lawyering."
5. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See id.
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ethics as intersecting circles, and to accept grudgingly that in the nar-
row area of intersection the substantive law and the law of lawyering
are the same. A model more consistent with this case study would
view substantive law and legal ethics as "warp and woof," as inter-
laced threads that together weave a whole tapestry.
Parts II and III of this Article discuss the relationship between
lawyers and bargaining unit members in the framework of intersecting
circles. After describing the role of unions and their obligations to
bargaining unit members, Part II applies this analysis to the relation-
ship between union lawyers and bargaining unit members. Next, Part
III considers how the law of lawyering applies to representation of
groups, group members, and nonclients, and applies this analysis to
the relationship between union lawyers and bargaining unit members.
Part IV then explains how the issues raised here are better analyzed as
part of interlaced threads in a tapestry as opposed to intersecting
circles.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW CONTEXT: UNIONS, THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION, GRIEVANCES, AND LAWYERS
This Part outlines the substantive law context of representation of
unions with regard to contract grievances. Labor law empowers em-
ployees to form unions to promote their collective interests. It also
imposes upon unions a duty of fair representation to all bargaining
unit members, whether or not they are union members. In the
processing of grievances, the duty permits unions broad discretion but
requires them to act in good faith, not arbitrarily, and without discrim-
ination. The duty does not require that the union provide a lawyer, or
permit a private lawyer, to advocate with regard to a particular
grievance.
A. Unions as Collectives
The legal recognition of labor unions as exclusive bargaining
agents for groups of employees is a relatively recent phenomenon. In
the early nineteenth century, many jurisdictions deemed the organiza-
tion of unions to be illegal. 8 Later in the nineteenth century, when
courts found the organization of unions lawful, they deemed unions to
be collections of individuals "lack[ing] legal personality" and the sta-
8. Craig Becker, Individual Rights and Collective Action: The Legal History of Trade
Unions in America, 100 HARV. L. REV. 672, 675 (1987) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER L. ToM-
LINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW AND THE ORGANIZED LA-
BOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985)).
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tus to "sue [ ]or be sued." 9 Even courts that found unions lawful re-
fused to enforce trade agreements between unions and employers on
the ground that they "were not consonant with the common law of
contracts."'10
As Professor Craig Becker has observed, "[b]y the turn of the
twentieth century, the profound disparity between the legal privileges
accorded the private business corporation and those extended to the
trade union increasingly determined the balance of power between
labor and capital in the workplace."" While the union lacked legal
personality, corporations "enjoyed virtually unrestricted freedom in
the marketplace."' 2
As the twentieth century progressed, changes in the status of un-
ions emerged. Early in the century, courts began to "grant unions de
facto legal personality" as a means of addressing labor unrest. 13 The
New Deal subsumed these piecemeal developments into extensive
federal regulation of labor-management relations.' 4 Federal legisla-
tion assured unions legal personality and "vested [them] with the right
to negotiate and administer collective bargains."' 5 The grounds for
providing unions with this role were "reducing industrial strife, restor-
ing mass purchasing power [during the Depression], promoting a
fairer distribution of economic resources, and furthering self-govern-
ment by employees."' 6 Although later legislation sought to provide
greater protection for employee choice, it "retained [labor law's] com-
mitment to collective action as an essential means to [these] multiple
ends."' 7
Under this statutory framework, unions and employers enter into
collective bargaining agreements. In collective bargaining, individual
employees obtain the benefit of the greater power of collective repre-
sentation,' 8 but must relinquish "their contractual freedom to negoti-
ate their own job conditions." 9 The union's task is to "accommodate
the overlapping and competing demands of varied interest groups,
9. Id. at 676.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 674.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 676.
14. Id. at 677.
15. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 185.
16. James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 939, 950 (1996).
17. Id. at 959.
18. Id. at 949-952.
19. Id. at 952 (footnote omitted).
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surrendering or compromising some demands to achieve others. '20
Similarly, collective bargaining requires employers to relinquish their
right to negotiate individually with employees and instead "to bargain
in good faith with [a] collectively constituted entity."'21
B. Grievances
When grievances (or disputes) arise as to the interpretation and
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, "[n]inety-nine per-
cent of collective bargaining agreements provide for arbitration. '22
Most agreements also provide for formal or informal procedures prior
to "the final step of ... arbitration,"23 including attempts to resolve
grievances at the shop level.
The subject of the grievance proceeding may be the employer's
treatment of the bargaining unit as a whole, such as the failure to com-
ply with provisions regarding wages and hours, or the treatment of an
individual or group of individuals, as in the case of discipline or dis-
charge.24 In either case, because grievances generally arise under col-
lective bargaining agreements between union and employer which
provide the union with control of grievances, the union (and not the
individual) is generally the formal party initiating, pursuing, and
resolving the grievance.25
20. Clyde W. Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agree-
ment: What Constitutes Fair Representation?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 257 (1977); see also
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1964) (observing that "[clonflict between em-
ployees represented by the same union is a recurring fact").
21. Brudney, supra note 16, at 952.
22. LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK
15 (1994). A "grievance" is an allegation that a collective bargaining agreement has been
improperly interpreted or applied. ROBERT E. DOHERTY, INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELA-
TIONS TERMS: A GLOSSARY 16 (5th ed. 1989). The term "grievance arbitration" refers to
arbitration of grievances arising under the terms of an existing collective bargaining agree-
ment. BRUCE FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW 287 (3d ed. 1990). Grievance
arbitration is distinct from "interest arbitration," which refers to arbitration of unresolved
bargaining issues on a new or amended agreement. Id. While grievance arbitration is com-
mon, outside of the public sector, interest arbitration is a relatively rare phenomenon in
the United States. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 134 (2d
ed. 1986).
23. GOULD, supra note 22, at 5. Most collective bargaining agreements establish pro-
cedures for the handling of grievances. The first step usually occurs at the shop level; if an
agreement is not reached at this initial phase, the grievance may be appealed in successive
steps. The number and types of these steps vary among contracts. Most grievance proce-
dures call for arbitration of grievances as a final step. ROBERT E. DOHERTY, INDUSTRIAL
AND LABOR RELATION TERMS: A GLOSSARY 16 (5th ed. 1989).
24. COOPER & NOLAN, supra note 22, at 86-138, 181-200.
25. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601,
627-30 (1956) (describing the collective bargaining practice); Summers, supra note 20, at
1100 [Vol. 37:1095
UNION LAWYER'S OBLIGATIONS
Union control of the grievance sometimes leads to conflict be-
tween the union and the employee or employees who are complaining
that the employer has violated their rights. As Judge Cudahy has
noted, the union may very well have "a somewhat different perspec-
tive than the individual employee it represents in a grievance mat-
ter."'2 6  In grievances, "[t]he union represents the majority of
employees, even while it is representing a single employee in a griev-
ance process. Thus even during an individual grievance procedure,
the union's own credibility, its integrity as a bargaining agent and the
interests of all its members may be at stake."27 Professors Michael C.
Harper and Ira C. Lupu have observed that the limited bargaining
leverage and financial resources require "union leaders to make diffi-
cult distributional judgments" throughout the process of resolving
problems arising from contract administration.28
C. The Duty of Fair Representation
In contract administration, as well as in contract negotiation, the
union's duty of fair representation regulates its relationship to bar-
gaining unit members. The Supreme Court and the National Labor
Relations Board developed the duty as a corollary29 to a union's "ex-
clusive ... statutory authority to represent all members of a desig-
nated unit.""°  As the Supreme Court has observed, this exclusive
authority "includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all
members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its
256 (stating that "unions assert under most collective agreements the exclusive power to
process and settle grievances and to carry cases to arbitration"). While acknowledging
union control over grievances, Summers challenges the commonly accepted notion that the
union "own[s] the grievance" on the ground that the union has a duty of fair representa-
tion. Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Em-
ployees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1093
(1984). For a discussion of the duty of fair representation, see infra Part II.C.
26. Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir. 1995).
27. Id.
28. Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair Representation As Equal Protection, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1211, 1212-13 (1985).
29. II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1410. The first case enunciat-
ing this doctrine was Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (hold-
ing that black employees had a right to challenge racially discriminatory collective
bargaining provisions). The Court applied the duty to the National Labor Relations Act in
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953) and Syres v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955). II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at
1411-1412. In 1962, the National Labor Relations Board found "that a breach of the duty
of fair representation amounted to an unfair labor practice." II THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW, supra note 3, at 1412.
30. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 76 (1991).
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discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbi-
trary conduct."'" This duty, which applies to all employees in the bar-
gaining unit, whether members of the union or not,32 has been
recently described by the Court as being "akin to the duty owed by
other fiduciaries to their beneficiaries. '3 3 The union's breach of the
duty often proves quite costly with remedies including awards of
backpay, future losses, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees,3
as well as equitable relief.35
The duty of fair representation attempts to balance the union's
prerogatives with the rights of the bargaining unit member. While
placing some limits on the union's conduct, the doctrine does not pro-
vide a bargaining unit member with "an absolute right to have his
grievance taken to arbitration. ' 36 The courts recognize that "[t]he
collective bargaining system.., of necessity subordinates the interests
of an individual employee to the collective interests of all employ-
ees." 37 So long as the union is acting in good faith, without discrimi-
nation, and is not arbitrary, the union may compromise the grievances
of some workers in the interests of the union as a whole,38 or may
refuse to pursue grievances it deems to lack merit.39
The duty of fair representation has become the focus of debate
regarding the role of unions and the relationship between unions and
bargaining unit members under labor relations law. At one end of the
spectrum, commentators oppose the duty of fair representation. They
describe the union's role as representing the interests of the majority
of its members, and criticize the duty for "fracturing the collective en-
titlement of a body of labor into the aggregated rights of individual
31. Id.
32. II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1444; see also Deboles v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 552 F.2d 1005, 1016 (3d Cir.) (stating that discrimination against non-
member employees is unlawful), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837 (1977); Hughes Tool Co. v.
NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 74 (5th Cir. 1945) (holding that company cannot discriminate against
employees who belong to another union or no union).
33. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 74.
34. II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1477 (footnotes omitted). Indi-
viduals covered by the National Labor Relations Act can sue for relief in court or pursue
an unfair labor practice before the National Labor Relations Board. Id. at 1423. The em-
ployee will often join the claim of breach of duty of fair representation with a claim that
the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement or has colluded with the union.
Id. at 1418, 1472.
35. II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1473.
36. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
37. Id. at 182.
38. See, e.g., Griffin v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 32 F.3d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir. 1994).
39. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 191.
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employees to be fairly represented."'4 They argue both that the duty
is inconsistent with labor law's emphasis on collective action,4 1 and
that it unduly directs the limited resources of the union to the interests
of individuals at the expense of the majority.42
At the other end of the spectrum, commentators describe the role
of unions in enforcing collective bargaining agreements as a collection
of individual interests, rather than as an organization having its own
interest. While acknowledging the need for union flexibility in negoti-
ating agreements, Clyde Summers argues that collective bargaining
agreements "create[ ] rights in the individual employee .... [How-
ever], [t]he effect of the contractual provision giving the union exclu-
sive control over the grievance procedure is to' deprive the individual
of his ability to enforce the contract on his own behalf. ' 43 As a result,
the union serves as the trustee of the individual's contract right, and
"assumes an obligation to act on behalf of the individual." 44
In the middle are those commentators who, like the courts, have
rejected both polar approaches. They seek standards which protect
both the union's authority to act on behalf of the organized group of
workers and the individual's right to be free from exploitation by the
majority.45 While viewing grievances as vindicating the rights of the
union, these commentators also describe grievances as implicating im-
portant rights of individual bargaining unit members. 6
D. The Duty of Fair Representation and the Relationship of Union
Lawyers to Bargaining Unit Members
In many, but certainly far from all, grievance matters, unions use
in-house lawyers or outside counsel as their representatives or advi-
sors for part or all of the process. 7 In the context of the duty of fair
representation, questions have arisen regarding whether a union must
provide a lawyer, whether a bargaining unit member may retain a pri-
40. Becker, supra note 8, at 680; see also Matthew W. Finkin, The Limits of Majority
Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183, 204-05 (1980); Mayer G. Freed et al.,
Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 461,465-66
(1983).
41. Becker, supra note 8, at 680-81.
42. Seymour M. Waldman, A Union Advocate's View, in THE CHANGING LAW OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION 109, 112 (Jean T. McKelvey ed. 1985).
43. Summers, supra note 20, at 256.
44. Summers, supra note 25, at 1094.
45. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 25, at 630-34; Harper & Lupu, supra note 28, at 1215-16.
46. See supra note 45.
47. In many instances, unions will instead use nonlawyer staff. See, e.g., FRANK
ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 241-42 (4th ed. 1985).
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vate union lawyer, and whether the union is liable for the union law-
yer's misconduct.
Where the collective bargaining agreement provides for union
control of grievances, the union has the authority to determine
whether to retain an attorney to process a grievance. Employees have
unsuccessfully argued that they had a right to choose their representa-
tive and also, their right to an attorney in complex grievances. 48 As
one commentator notes, "[c]ourts have rejected claims that the duty
of fair representation requires a union to furnish a lawyer to represent
a grievant in arbitration. 49
The rationale for the union's authority to retain counsel derives
both from the existence of collective right in the union and the ab-
sence of a countervailing right for the individual. Control of the griev-
ance process includes determining the advocate with regard to the
grievance, as well as which arguments and concessions are made.50 At
the same time, the member only has the right to representation which
is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, but not to representa-
tion at the level of the skills of a trained professional.5 1 For this rea-
son, even where the union retains a lawyer, the lawyer's failure to
satisfy professional standards does not breach the union's duty of fair
representation. 2
What does constitute a violation of the duty of fair representation
is using a discriminatory process for determining whether to retain a
lawyer. Some unions, for example, have taken the position that they
will only provide attorneys to represent grievances on behalf of union
members and not for nonmembers. They argue that such policies are
not impermissible discrimination. Rather, it is "an extra service, rep-
48. MARTIN H. MALIN, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE UNION 389 (1988); see also
Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985).
49. MALIN, supra note 48, at 389.
50. See, e.g., Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985)
("Decisions in other circuits hold that it is for the union to decide the circumstances under
which an attorney will be supplied to a grievant"); Johnson v. United Steelworkers, Dist. 7,
Local Union No. 2378-B, 843 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that "[flederal law
provides that unions are to be the exclusive bargaining representatives for workers in
union shops .... ").
51. See, e.g., Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909, 920 (7th Cir. 1989)
("We have no doubt that certain acts or omissions by a union official representing a griev-
ant, while actionable if done by an attorney, would not constitute a breach of the union
duty of fair representation."); MALIN, supra note 48, at 389 (stating "arbitration is not the
same as litigation and ... reliance on representation by nonlawyer union officials, standing
alone, cannot, as a matter of law, be a breach of duty").
52. See, e.g., Curtis v. United Transp. Union, 700 F.2d 457,458 (8th Cir. 1983) (agree-
ing with the argument that the union should not be held to the reasonable attorney stan-
dard for determining breach of the duty of fair representation).
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resentation over and above the level of adequacy, a benefit, and an
incentive to membership. '53 Rejecting this argument, courts have
found these policies to constitute unlawful discrimination. 4
Another issue related to union control and collective bargaining
is the question of whether the employee may retain his or her own
counsel to process the grievance. Where the collective bargaining
agreement gives the union exclusive control of the grievance, just as
the union can decide not to use an attorney, it can decide to forbid the
employee from using her own attorney.5 The Ninth Circuit has noted
that "no court has adopted the rule that employees are entitled to
independently retained counsel in arbitration proceedings, or that the
exclusion of such attorneys from arbitration violates the duty of fair
representation."56
At the same time, the union does not have unlimited power to
control the employee's access to a lawyer. In Seymour v. Olin Corp. ,
the employee alleged that the union refused to process his grievance
unless he agreed not to consult with an outside attorney he had re-
tained. 8 The Fifth Circuit held that this allegation, if proven, would
constitute a breach of the duty of fair representation. 9 It found little
collective interest in prohibiting consultation with counsel. The court
noted that "[a] union's interest in acting as exclusive spokesman...
[and its] ability to represent all its employees is not compromised by
the mere fact that an employee is consulting with an attorney regard-
ing matters related to his discharge."6 The court found that the indi-
vidual employee has a legitimate interest in consulting counsel,
53. National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d
1402, 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Brief for Petitioner, at 13) (internal quotes omitted).
54. MALIN, supra note 48, at 390. Compare National Treasury Employees Union v.
Federal Labor Relations Auth., 721 F.2d at 1407 (stating that "as exclusive bargaining
agent, the Union may not provide [attorney representation] exclusively for Union mem-
bers") with National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 800
F.2d 1165, 1170-71 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding it permissible to deny attorney representation
in situations where "the individual retains the right to protect himself in the employment
relationship").
55. MALIN, supra note 48, at 390; see also Garcia, 58 F.3d at 1179 ("Unions are given
considerable discretion in handling grievance procedures. This discretion includes the right
to limit the role of outside attorneys in the grievance process.")
56. Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1985). Even where
a union permits an employee to retain her own lawyer, the employer has no obligation to
arbitrate with the employee or the lawyer. See General Drivers Local 984 v. Malone &
Hyde, Inc., 23 F.3d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1994).
57. 666 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).
58. Id. at 207.
59. Id. at 210.
60. Id. at 209.
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especially where the interests of the union might deviate from those of
an individual employee.6'
Courts and the NLRB have also held that employees .have a right
to retain their own counsel as a remedy for breach of the duty of fair
representation. Where the NLRB has found that the union has
breached its duty of fair representation in failing to pursue the em-
ployee's rights, it has sometimes ordered the union to pay for the em-
ployee to hire independent counsel to pursue those rights.62 Similarly,
courts have awarded attorneys fees to the prevailing plaintiff in fair
representation cases.63 While some courts have employed a "private
attorney general" theory to justify such an award,' 4 others have found
them a principal element of plaintiff's damages, incurred to do what
the "union was obliged but failed to do on his behalf. 65
III. THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAWYERING: THE UNION LAWYER'S
OBLIGATIONS TO BARGAINING UNIT MEMBERS
A. The Legal Ethics Complexity
Legal ethics does not provide an easy formula for analyzing the
union lawyer's relationship to bargaining unit members. The union's
status as a client, the potential clienthood of the bargaining unit mem-
ber, and the application of the derivative client doctrine, make this
analysis complex. As a result, courts and commentators have em-
ployed three different perspectives: the union as the client, both union
and bargaining unit member as clients, and the bargaining unit mem-
ber as a derivative client.66
One level of complexity arises from the lawyer's representation
of the union as an organization. On their face, the legal ethics rules
do provide a simple set of rules for representation of an organization,
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., NLRB v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 509 F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (9th
Cir.) (finding that the order that the union pay counsel fees was within the power granted
to the NLRB), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); United Steelworkers Local 15063
(Shanks), 281 N.L.R.B. 1275, 1275 (1986) (requiring union to pay for the employee's repre-
sentation); Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n Local 106 (Owens-Illinois, Inc.), 240 N.L.R.B. 324,
1979 WL 8704, at *3 (1979) (ordering payment of fees for employee's counsel).
63. II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1479.
64. Id., supra note 3, at 1480-81. The private attorney general theory justifies an ex-
ception to the "American Rule" barring the award of attorney's fees on the ground that
such awards provide lawyers with a needed incentive to enforce rights under law.
65. Scott v. Local 377 International Bhd. of Teamsters, 548 F.2d 1244, 1246 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); see II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at
1481 (analyzing the Scott decision).
66. See infra Part III.B.
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such as a union. The client is the union.67 The bargaining unit mem-
bers are not clients and are not entitled to any client-like rights.
But while the rules of organizational representation may appear
simple, implementation is another matter. Organizations as entities
exist only in the abstract. In practice, organizations can only act
through human representatives. As Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct recognizes, the entity provides the lawyer with
instructions "through its duly authorized constituents."'
The task of determining the lawyer's relationship to the various
constituents of the organization is complex.69 In different circum-
stances, different constituents will have the authority to provide in-
structions to the lawyer. Some decisions may be made at the highest
level of the organization and some at lower levels. Some authorities
have also found that under some circumstances, such as a derivative
suit against a corporation, the corporation's lawyer properly repre-
sents only the corporation, as an abstract entity, and should not follow
instructions from any constituent.7 °
Accordingly, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. has observed that
the efforts of courts and scholars to apply legal ethics to corporate
representation have been "baffled and baffling."' 71 Making the union
lawyer's obligations even more baffling is the inclusion in the bargain-
ing unit of both union members, who are constituents of the union,
and nonunion members, whose grievances the union must also pro-
cess, as well as financial core members whose status as members or
nonmembers is unclear.72
The second factor is what Professor Ted Schneyer terms
"cienthood."73 He notes that "[t]he brute fact that establishes the
67. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1995).
68. Id.
69. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHics OF LAWYERING
747-48 (2d ed. 1994).
70. Id. at 765-69.
71. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analy-
sis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 15, 30 (1987). As Professor John Leubsdorf has observed,
"[t]he lawyer-client relationship traditionally has been conceived as one between individu-
als." John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
825, 825 (1992). For a more detailed discussion of the individualism inherent in legal eth-
ics, see Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Con-
flicts in Representing Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1274-79 (1994).
72. See supra note 3. This Part will refer generally to union members and nonmem-
bers. It does not determine whether financial core members are properly members or
nonmembers, but rather, identifies how this issue further complicates the analysis.
73. Theodore Schneyer, Clienthood (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
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existence of most lawyer-client relationships is a contract in which
lawyer L agrees to provide legal services in return for compensation
from C."174 In that case, the union would be the union lawyer's client.
Sometimes, however, as a matter of expectations or of policy, the law
of lawyering determines that the contractual relationship does not dic-
tate who is a client. For example, in the insurance defense context,
even though both the insurer and the insured have a relationship with
the lawyer, "some courts and commentators have taken the view that
the lawyer represents the insured alone. '75 Their rationale is to struc-
ture the lawyer's incentives to protect the relatively vulnerable in-
sured.76  One could argue based on a similar policy, or based on
expectations,77 that despite the union's retention of the lawyer, the
bargaining unit member is a client.
The third factor is the concept of the derivative client. The law-
yer's duties to a derivative client are higher than to other nonclients.
Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes have ex-
plained that where "the lawyer is hired to represent the fiduciary, and
the fiduciary is legally required to serve the beneficiary, the lawyer
should be deemed employed to further that service. ' 78 The derivative
client doctrine has implications for the lawyer's duties of loyalty, com-
petence, and confidentiality. 79 Under the duty of fair representation,
the union has a fiduciary obligation to the bargaining unit member,80
who may therefore be a derivative client.
B. The Union Lawyer's Obligations to the Bargaining Unit Member
The ethics codes, courts and commentators, variously and incon-
sistently, rely on these three factors to characterize the relationship
between the union lawyer and the bargaining unit member. The three
alternative models employed are: the union as the sole client, the
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id.; see also Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of
Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 257, 273-80 (1995) (discussing professional
responsibility in the insurance field). As a general matter, a lawyer should not permit an
insurance company or other third party who pays for a client's representation to influence
the lawyer's conduct. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(c)
(proposing that in some circumstances both the insurance company and the insured should
be considered clients).
76. Schneyer, supra note 73, at 11.
77. See supra Part II.C. and infra part III.B.2.a.
78. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 1.3:108 (2d ed. Supp. 1996).
79. See infra notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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union and member both as clients, and the member as a derivative
client.
1. The Union as Entity Client and Bargaining Unit Member as
Nonclient
As a matter of black letter legal ethics, the union lawyer's client is
the union. The union's lawyer in a grievance matter must follow direc-
tions from authorized union officials, even on those occasions where
the "utility or prudence [of those directions] is doubtful.""1
Similarly, the lawyer's duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and com-
petence run to the union and not the bargaining unit member. The
lawyer must protect the union's confidences, even from union mem-
bers, and the union itself is the holder of the attorney-client privi-
lege.' The lawyer owes no independent duty of confidentiality to the
bargaining unit member and indeed must reveal the member's confi-
dences, if relevant, to the union leadership. 3 On the other hand, if
the union chooses to protect the confidentiality of the bargaining unit
member's communications, they may be protected as the union's con-
fidential communication.84
The conflict rules apply in a corresponding way. The lawyer's
only duty of loyalty is to the union, its sole client. Any differences
between the union and bargaining unit member, even if a union mem-
ber, are irrelevant to the duty of loyalty and therefore fail to implicate
Rules 1.7 or 1.9. Accordingly, in duty of fair representation cases, at-
tempts to disqualify union lawyers on the ground that they previously
handled the employee's grievance have generally been unsuccessful.85
Under entity representation, the lawyer's duty of competence and
exposure to malpractice liability runs to the union. In the leading case
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 3 (1995).
82. See id.; see also HAZARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 236 (stating that "current man-
agement of a corporation controls the privilege on behalf of the corporation").
83. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.13 & cmt. (1995).
84. Most jurisdictions permit corporations to protect the employee's communications
with the corporation's attorney as privileged. Id. at 236 n.34. See Upjohn v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981) (holding that corporations may choose to protect as privileged
communications from low level employees to the corporation's lawyers). Some jurisdic-
tions, however, only permit corporations to protect the communications of the "control
group"-those high level employees who control the corporation. HAZARD ET AL., supra
note 69, at 236 n.34. See Consolidated Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 252
(Ill. 1982) (rejecting the Upjohn approach).
85. See Adamo v. Hotel Workers' Union, 655 F. Supp. 1129, 1129-30 (E.D. Mich.
1987); Griesemer v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1393, 482 F. Supp. 312, 314-15
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
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of Peterson v. 'Kennedy,8 6 a union member argued that a union staff
attorney had committed malpractice in handling the member's griev-
ance.87 The court held that the immunity of union officials from indi-
vidual liability in an action against the union' applied to attorneys for
unions, whether in-house or outside counsel.89 Of course, the union
could sue the lawyer for malpractice with regard to the grievance, and
the bargaining unit member could sue if the lawyer was representing
the member in addition to the union.90 Moreover, the bargaining unit
member could recover against the union if the lawyer's conduct was
not just negligent, but sufficiently egregious to make the union liable
for breach of the duty of fair representation.
One complication to entity representation occurs where the au-
thorized representatives of the union engage in unlawful conduct pos-
ing threat of "substantial injury" to the union. In these circumstances,
the lawyer may ask the union leadership to review such conduct, and
may resign if the leadership refuses to prevent it.91 In a related situa-
tion, similar to a shareholder derivative suit where union members file
an action alleging that union officers have breached their fiduciary
duty to the union, the court may require representation for the union
independent of its duly authorized constituents.92
A second complication relates to the composition of the bargain-
ing unit. The legal ethics rules sometimes distinguish the union law-
yer's obligations to bargaining unit members depending on whether or
not they are union members. In contrast, the duty of fair representa-
tion forbids discrimination between union and nonunion bargaining
unit members.
As noted above, neither member nor nonmember is entitled to
the lawyer's loyalty, competence, or confidentiality. What the union
86. 771 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 1251.
88. Id. at 1256-57. The union member was not without any remedy-he could in
certain circumstances seek relief from the union. Id. at 1259. However, former employees
are precluded from bringing action against lawyers who acted as their union representa-
tive. Id.
89. Id. at 1258; see also Breda v. Scott, 1 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 1993) (raising the issue in
the context of outside counsel). For a discussion of the policies supporting immunity, see
Schneyer, supra note 73, at 28-32.
90. Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259.
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.13(c) (1995).
92. Yablonski v. United Mine Workers, 448 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
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lawyer does owe them is a duty to avoid intentional wrongs. 3 The
emerging trend, however, is for jurisdictions to go further and provide
nonclients with a right to sue a lawyer under "doctrines [such] as third
party beneficiary, negligent representation, gratuitous undertaking,
and the 'balance of factors' test."94 While analogous arguments could
be made on behalf of bargaining unit members where a lawyer has
negligently handled a grievance, federal law provides the lawyer with
immunity from such a suit.95 As a practical matter, whatever the law-
yer's potential liability, if the employees' interests coincide with those
of the union, the lawyer will have a duty to the union to zealously and
competently represent the employees' interests.
In other areas, differences appear.96 If nonmembers do not have
their own lawyer, the union lawyer may speak with them, but must
make clear that the lawyer does not represent them.97 In contrast,
Rule 1.13 only requires the lawyer to provide such a warning to a
union member when it is apparent that the organization's interests are
adverse to those of the union member.98 At that point, though, in
addition to suggesting that the member consider obtaining independ-
ent representation as with the nonmember, the union lawyer must also
explain that the conversation may not be privileged 99-a requirement
which does not generally exist under Rule 4.3 for nonclients such as
the nonmember. 1' ° Under Rule 4.3, a lawyer would only have such an
obligation where she actually knows that the nonmember mistakenly
believes the conversation to be privileged.' 0'
Other differences present potentially significant problems in
processing a grievance on behalf of a nonmember. The union lawyer
should not give the nonmember legal or other advice other than to
seek counsel."° The union lawyer may give the union member, as a
93. Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconceptualiz-
ing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other Inherently Ambigu-
ous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REv. 659, 659 (1994).
94. Id. at 660.
95. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
96. Whether a financial core member is a member or nonmember for these purposes
is not clear. Their lack of internal voting rights suggests they are nonmembers while their
technical membership supports viewing them as members. See supra note 3.
97. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 4.3 cmt. (1995).
98. Id. at Rule 1.13(d).
99. Id. at Rule 1.13 cmt. 7.
100. Id. at Rule 4.3 & cmt.
101. Id.
102. Id. If the union lawyer is aware that either the member or nonmember is repre-
sented by counsel with regard to the grievance, the union lawyer may not communicate
with the employee without counsel's consent. Id. at Rule 4.2.
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constituent, legal advice related to the lawyer's representation of the
union. Similarly, while the union may protect the confidentiality and
privileged nature of communications with the union member as a con-
stituent of the union, no protection exists for communications with the
nonmember.1 0 3
The legal ethics rules restricting advice and confidentiality to a
nonmember interfere with the representation of a grievance involving
them. The absence of the privilege would make the nonmember's
communications to the lawyer subject to disclosure. Either the disclo-
sure of this information or the chilling of discussions with the lawyer
would make it more difficult for the union to advocate for the griev-
ance or decide whether to resolve it. The ethical restriction on the
lawyer's offering advice to the nonmember has a similar effect.
In addition, the union lawyer's differential treatment of the non-
member poses problems under the duty of fair representation. The
duty generally proscribes discriminatory treatment of nonmembers.
The application of the legal ethics rules would sometimes result in the
nonmember receiving lower quality representation simply because
they are a nonmember.
To avoid this dilemma, unions could argue that the applicable en-
tity is the bargaining unit and not the union. The union has the au-
thority by virtue of its role as representative of the bargaining unit,
not by virtue of its own status as an entity. If the union lawyer's client
were the bargaining unit represented by the union, both union mem-
ber and nonmember would be similarly situated as bargaining unit
members and the legal ethics distinctions between them disappear.
While the argument is quite reasonable, it appears to be a novel
one and its success is unclear. On one hand, one could analogize the
union to the board of directors of a corporation. Just as shareholders
elect the board to manage the corporation, the bargaining unit mem-
bers select the union to serve as its exclusive bargaining agent. On the
other hand, the perception of unions and lawyers may be quite differ-
ent. It may very well be that the lawyer and the union understand the
union, and not the bargaining unit, to be the client.
2. Both the Union and Bargaining Unit Member as Clients
Although the majority of courts have found the union to be the
lawyer's client, some authorities argue for recognizing both the union
and member as separate clients.
103. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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a. The Grounds for Finding the Member a Client
One line of authority suggests a general rule that a bargaining
unit member is a separate client of the union's lawyer. The rationale
for this view is that the union attorney is indeed acting on behalf of
the member and not solely on behalf of the union." 4 As one com-
mentator has argued, "in pursuing a member's [grievance], a union
attorney is representing the member, though the union's interests may
also be served.' 10 5 At least one court has applied a similar rationale.
It held that the union member was a client because the attorney's rep-
resentation of the member in the grievance proceeding was an in-
tended benefit of union membership. The court rejected the union's
claim of representation "as a separate entity, independent from its
members.' °6
A second line of authority looks to the facts of a particular situa-
tion to determine whether a union's attorney also represents a union
member. 107 This line of authority, in turn, divides into two competing
approaches. One approach weighs against finding a lawyer-client re-
lationship. Under it, courts start from an understanding that a union
member "views the union attorney as an arm of his union rather than
as an individual he has chosen as his lawyer."' 08 The union member
has the burden of demonstrating that particular circumstances indi-
cate the existence of a lawyer-client relationship. These circumstances
include the lawyer's express representations, the member's express in-
dication to the lawyer that she understands the lawyer to be represent-
ing her, or other indicia that the relationship was a confidential one.'09
104. Tim Adams, Comment, Labor Law Preemption: The Ninth Circuit Grants Mal-
practice Immunity to Union Attorneys: Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1985),
61 WASH. L. REv. 1503, 1514-15 (1986).
105. Id.
106. Stone v. City of Philadelphia, Civ.A. No. 86-1877, 1986 WL 13483, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 25, 1986).
107. Of course, in the rare situation where the union member and the attorney enter
into a retainer agreement, their relationship is clear. See, e.g., Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259.
Without further explanation, the Peterson court also suggests that attorneys are liable to
the client where the attorney provides personal services "wholly unrelated to the collective
bargaining process; e.g., drafting a will, handling a divorce or litigating a personal injury
suit." Id. Whether this liability to the employee would be premised on the implied rela-
tionship, the intention to benefit the union member, or solely the absence of collective
bargaining concerns, is unclear.
108. Id. at 1258.
109. Adamo v. Hotel Workers's Union, 655 F. Supp. 1129, 1129-30 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
The requirements of the latter element are unclear. The Adamo court refers to whether
"any confidences were exchanged." Presumably, this means information understood to be
confidential from the union, but the phrase is unclear. Id. at 1129-30; see also Griesemer,
482 F. Supp. at 314-15.
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Not surprisingly, courts applying this test have found that union mem-
bers have failed to meet their burden.110
A second approach weighs in favor of finding a relationship. This
approach presumes that the union lawyer represents the member ab-
sent express notification to the contrary. As one court observed, "the
[union] member is not legally sophisticated enough to understand"
that the union lawyer represents the union, and not the member, in a
grievance proceeding."' Accordingly, that court found that the union
member's subjective understanding and sharing of information with
the lawyer were sufficient to create a lawyer-client relationship. 12
Even though these cases deal with union members, their rationales
would apply with equal force to nonunion members of bargaining
units.
b. The Implications of the Member's Status as Client
If the bargaining unit member, as well as the union, is a client of
the lawyer, the duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and competence be-
come more complex. The union lawyer might have to share relevant
union confidences, such as the union's internal appraisal of the griev-
ance, with the member in jurisdictions where joint representation is
understood to waive confidentiality among joint clients."3 Even
where confidentiality is not waived, the privilege is waived. There-
fore, if the member were later to sue the union for breach of the duty
of fair representation in its advocacy of the grievance, the lawyer
would have to testify as to confidential communications with the
union, as well as with the member." 4
These confidentiality issues pose only one set of the conflicts
problems. In every grievance proceeding the possibility exists that the
employee will not be satisfied with the outcome and will sue the union
for breach of the duty of fair representation. Therefore, whatever the
particular facts of a grievance, a potential conflict exists. Exacerbat-
ing this potential conflict is the possible harm to both clients of the
loss of privilege in a duty of fair representation action. While such
potential conflict would certainly require the lawyer to make disclo-
sures, obtain consents, and objectively determine that the representa-
110. Adamo, 665 F. Supp. at 1130; Griesemer, 482 F. Supp. at 315.
111. DeCherro v. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, 404 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257 (App. Div.
1978).
112. Id. at 258.
113. Pearce, supra note 71, at 1262-63 n.48.
114. See Griesemer, 482 F. Supp. at 314-15.
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tion of both clients will not be adversely affected,' 15 it would also
weigh heavily against joint representation. It would therefore appear
that a lawyer would have difficulty representing both union and bar-
gaining unit member unless the grievance was easily resolvable to
their mutual satisfaction.
Even where joint representation would arise as a result of a mu-
tual agreement or as a matter of law, conflicts might develop. At the
time when the interests of the parties become adverse, such as if the
union decided not to pursue the grievance or to resolve it against the
member's wishes, the lawyer would probably have to withdraw. A
similar result would occur where the representation of one client
might be materially limited, such as where the union revealed a confi-
dence the member would want to know. In these circumstances,
moreover, the lawyer would probably have to withdraw from repre-
senting both clients because of the similarity of the matters and the
adversity of the parties. At that point, the union would have to use a
nonlawyer advocate not bound by the legal ethics rules to represent
both union and bargaining unit member, or would have to provide
two new lawyers, one for the union and an independent one for the
member. In addition, were the union member to sue the union for
breach of the duty of fair representation, the lawyer would not be able
to represent either union or member without consent of the other."
6
The union would then have to find a lawyer unfamiliar with the griev-
ance to defend it.
Under this model, a union would have strong reasons not to use
lawyers in grievance proceedings. Any lawyer would be viewed as
representing both union and bargaining unit member and would be
unlikely to represent both. As noted above, the only way to avoid the
myriad conflict problems and use a lawyer would be to provide a sepa-
rate, independent lawyer for the bargaining unit member. Employing
one nonlawyer who would not have to worry about the conflicts rules
would be a far less expensive solution. It would also permit the union
to use an advocate it could trust and control for both union and mem-
ber. At the same time, it would deprive the union of legal expertise.
3. The Union as Client and the Member as Derivative Client
Viewing the union member as a beneficiary of the union's fiduci-
ary obligations creates yet another way of describing the union law-
yer's relationship to the union member-the union is the primary
115. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcr Rule 1.7 (1995).
116. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.9(a) (1995).
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client and the union member is a derivative client.117 Under this ap-
proach, the lawyer should follow the primary client's instructions un-
less they would wrongfully harm the beneficiary." 8 At that point, the
lawyer has a duty to disobey them, for the fiduciary is not permitted to
use a lawyer to that end." 9
This approach has support in the context of union representation.
The Supreme Court has analogized the union's duty of fair represen-
tation to the duty owed by other fiduciaries to their beneficiaries. 2 °
Accordingly, courts have applied the derivative client approach to af-
ford union members access to privileged information in duty of fair
representation suits. Employing a doctrine originated in corporate
derivative suits,12 ' these decisions provide that where union members
sue a union "for behavior allegedly inimical [to] their interests,"'122 the
members can obtain privileged information from the union upon a
showing of good cause.' 23 Some jurisdictions do not even require a
showing of good cause in a beneficiary's suit against a fiduciary. They
hold "that the fiduciary does not have a privilege to assert against the
beneficiary. "124
The derivative client approach has other potential implications
for the union lawyer. The existence of a fiduciary duty to a nonclient
union member could arguably provide the basis for a successful dis-
qualification motion in a duty of fair representation suit. For example,
in Westinghouse v. Kerr-McGee Corporation,25 the Seventh Circuit
disqualified the plaintiff's law firm because it had previously repre-
117. Hazard, supra note 71, at 31. But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-380 (1994) which argues that:
The fact that the fiduciary has obligations to the beneficiaries of the trust or estate
does not in itself either expand or limit the lawyer's obligations to the fiduciary
client under the Model Rules, nor impose on the lawyer obligations toward the
beneficiaries that the lawyer would not have toward other third parties.
Id.
118. See Hazard, supra note 71, at 32.
119. Hazard, supra note 71, at 32. But see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, supra note 117.
120. Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 74 (1991).
121. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974
(1971).
122. Nellis v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 144 F.R.D. 68, 71 (E.D. Va. 1992).
123. Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671, 681 (D. Kan. 1986); Boswell v.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 164, 1981 WL 27188 (D.N.J. 1981) (stating that
"the availability of the attorney-client privilege should be subject to the right of the [bene-
ficiary] to show cause why it should be invoked in the particular instance"); see also Nellis,
144 F.R.D. at 71.
124. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 808. This doctrine does not appear to have
been applied in breach of duty of fair representation suits.
125. 580 F.2d 1311, 1321-22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
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sented an organization of which the defendant was a member in a
related matter. Although the court found that the defendant's organi-
zational membership did not create a lawyer-client relationship with
the firm, it held that under the circumstances it did create a relation-
ship of trust and reliance sufficient to implicate the law firm's obliga-
tion of loyalty to the defendant even as a nonclient.126
The derivative client approach could also provide grounds for
lawyer liability, such as for negligently failing to prevent the union's
breach of the duty of fair representation. In Ficket v. Superior Court
of Pima County,127 for example, the court permitted the conservator
of an incompetent's estate to sue the lawyer for the former guardian
for negligently permitting the former guardian to breach his fiduciary
obligations to the beneficiary.
IV. A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF
LEGAL ETHICS AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Intersecting Circles or Interlaced Threads?
Professor Susan Koniak has observed that the legal profession
"takes for granted that the domain of professional ethics is separate
from the domain of law.' 128 This perception dominates the prevailing
approach to analyzing legal ethics and substantive law. It treats them
as separate circles which intersect in a small, contested area where one
subject provides the rule for the other.
In the field of legal ethics, authorities and commentators often
consider issues only with regard to legal ethics categories and without
regard for the implications for substantive law.' 29 Law schools follow
a similar approach. Legal ethics is generally taught as an independent
course which is largely confined to explication of legal ethics rules. 3 °
The organized bar's testing of legal ethics through the Multi-State
Professional Responsibility Examination similarly focuses on legal
ethics as a separate, self-referential subject.131
126. Id.
127. 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. 1976).
128. Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389,
1396 (1992).
129. See Schneyer, supra note 73, at 1 (criticizing this approach).
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In a related manner, commentators and authorities analyze the
substantive law with little attention to legal ethics.132 The place of
legal ethics in law schools illustrates how marginal it is to the study of
the substantive law. Professor Deborah Rhode observes that "[i]n
most institutions, required ethics courses meet for minimal time; in
many others, they are treated as intellectual interlopers, staffed by a
reluctant, rotating cadre of junior faculty and outside lecturers.' '1 33
Not surprisingly, substantive law scholars find little value in consider-
ing the interaction between legal ethics and substantive law. A survey
of casebooks found that the "median amount of coverage [of legal
ethics] in each volume was 1.4% of the total pages."' 1
While commentators treat the circles of substantive law and legal
ethics as separate, they also acknowledge the existence of limited ar-
eas of intersection. In these areas, the substantive law and the "law of
lawyering" are the same. Generally, the substantive law provides the
law of lawyering. Some examples of this intersection are the attorney-
client privilege provided by the law of evidence, 35 Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 and the tort of legal malpractice. 37
To preserve their professional autonomy, lawyers seek to minimize or
eliminate these intersections, and instead place the law of lawyering
solely within the control of the legal profession. 138
But the model of overlapping circles was not always how legal
authorities understood the relationship between substantive law and
legal ethics. Judge George Sharswood, the father of our modem legal
ethics codes, viewed substantive law and legal ethics as inextricably
intertwined. 39 In his classic 1854 essay on professional ethics, he ex-
132. Id. at 41. Professor Rhode has challenged this approach and championed the
teaching of ethics throughout the curriculum. See id. at 54-56.
133. Id. at 40.
134. See, e.g., id. at 41.
135. See, e.g, HAZARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 221 n.6 (discussing how Federal Rule of
Evidence 501 allows determination of the attorney-client privilege to be pursuant to the
principles of common law in the light of reason and experience).
136. See, e.g., HAZARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 414-17 (discussing how the threat of
sanctions for malicious prosecution of a frivolous claim protects the attorney-client
privilege).
137. See, e.g., HAZARD ET AL., supra note 69, at 175-76 (describing briefly the history
and development of the tort of legal malpractice).
138. See generally Koniak, supra note 128 (describing lawyers' resistance to outside
regulation); see also David Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv.
799, 812-14 (1992) (discussing professional compliance and independent arguments).
139. See generally Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal
Ethics Codes, 6 GEo. J. LEOAL ETHics 241 (1992) (discussing Judge Sharswood's impact
on modern legal ethics).
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plained how the substantive goals of the legal system established the
framework for understanding the lawyer's ethical obligations. 140
A growing number of commentators are reviving a more complex
understanding of the interaction between substantive law and legal
ethics. Professor Deborah Rhode has championed the "pervasive"
approach to legal ethics, which would make legal ethics an integral
part of all substantive courses.' 41 Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Susan P. Koniak, and Roger C. Cramton propose "the 'pervasive
method' in reverse.' 1 42 Their casebook seeks to place legal ethics in
the context of relevant areas of substantive law. 143 Other commenta-
tors have made similar efforts. David Wilkins'" and Ted Schneyer
urge that the development of lawyer regulation should include "close
attention to the specific legal and factual context at hand.' 1 45 Charles
Silver and Kent Syverud describe the interconnection of insurance
law, procedure and legal ethics.' 46  William Simon,'1 47  Robert
Gordon,'" and David Luban141 contend that the substantive goal of
justice under the law depends upon the law and ethics of lawyering.
These works suggest the emergence of a new model for examin-
ing the connection between legal ethics and substantive law. Rather
than treat these areas as separate but intersecting circles, the new
model would describe them as interlaced threads forming a larger tap-
estry. This model has two primary characteristics. First, the threads
of legal ethics and substantive law connect in many places, not just in
140. Id. at 259. For example, the substantive goal of protecting property rights re-
quired the lawyer to "refuse to pursue legal goals that frustrate legitimate property rights,
such as by helping a client use legal means to avoid the 'just demands of creditors."' Id at
266. Similarly, the substantive goal of protecting the individual from a potential abuse of
state authority and implementing the constitutional right to a trial according to law, re-
quired the criminal defense lawyer to zealously defend the defendant even if the lawyer
was convinced of the client's guilt. See id. at 265.
141. See Rhode, supra note 130, at 32; see generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (1994) (providing a detailed
discussion of the pervasive method).
142. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 69, at vi.
143. Id.
144. Wilkins, supra note 138, at 799.
145. Schneyer, supra note 73, at 63.
146. Silver & Syverud, supra note 75, at 255.
147. See generally William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1083 (1988) (proposing that lawyers exercise discretion and judgment in representing
clients, rather than merely restricting their duties to black letter ethical rules).
148. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49
MD. L. REv. 255 (1990) (discussing legal ethics in the context of a corporate practice
setting).
149. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988)
(comprehensive discussion of ethics in the law).
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the limited area where one subject provides the rule for the other.
Second, the relationship between the two subjects is reciprocal. They
both have a significant influence on each other.
B. Comparing the Two Models: The Union Lawyer's Obligations to
the Bargaining Unit Member
This Article offers a case study to begin testing the two competing
models of the relationship between substantive law and legal ethics.
The case study suggests that the model of interlaced threads offers a
far more comprehensive and nuanced method for analyzing the obli-
gations of union lawyers than the model of intersecting circles.
Although less comprehensive, the concept of intersecting circles
does provide some insight into the relationship between labor law and
legal ethics. One area of intersection between these circles is the doc-
trine of immunity from liability for a union lawyer. 5 ° In this instance,
the substantive law provides the law of lawyering in recognition that a
union's relationship with its lawyers is significant to maintaining the
substantive goals of labor law.
While consistent with the model of intersecting circles, explana-
tion of the basis of this rule resembles broader connections underlying
the model of interlaced threads. The doctrine of immunity for union
officials was designed to prevent "the use of private lawsuits ... as a
'union busting' device,' ' 15 1 and to protect the ability of unions to enlist
qualified representatives. 52 When lawyers function in the same ca-
pacity as union officials, such as in processing grievances, they receive
the same protections. 53 To do otherwise would undermine the pur-
poses of the immunity doctrine. 54
In addition, the availability of the negligence standard against a
union representative would undermine the rationality and symmetry
150. See Schneyer, supra note 73, at 28-32 (discussing derivation of immunity doctrine
in substantive concerns of labor law).
151. Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989).
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id. at 6; Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1256 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1122 (1986).
154. Ted Schneyer has a slightly different approach to analyzing immunity for union
lawyers. Rather than begin the analysis with an understanding that the lawyer's obligation
is to promote the entity's interests, he suggests that legal ethics should ordinarily weigh in
favor of enhancing the lawyer's obligations to the individual member. However, in light of
countervailing policy considerations, such as protecting the interests of other union mem-




of relations between the union and its members. 155 The duty of fair
representation requires a member to demonstrate "arbitrary, discrimi-
natory, or bad faith" actions by the union. 56 The Supreme Court has
observed that negligence does not meet this standard. 157 Permitting
nonclient suits against a union lawyer based on a negligence theory
would therefore alter the relationship between union and member by
permitting recovery against a union representative under a lower
standard.
Although the rationale for the immunity doctrine fits within the
intersecting circles approach, its application suggests the perspective
of interlaced threads. In resolving whether the bargaining unit mem-
ber is a union lawyer's client, courts have disagreed as to whether to
place the burden on the member to demonstrate the existence of the
relationship, or on the lawyer to disprove it. 158 Resolution of this is-
sue determines whether the lawyer may take advantage of the doc-
trine of immunity. The union lawyer only has immunity from the
member's suit if the lawyer is the union's lawyer and not the bargain-
ing unit member's.' 59
Beyond the immunity doctrine are a number of aspects of labor
law and legal ethics that diverge under the intersecting circle model,
but appear to influence each other as the model of interlaced threads
would predict. One set of these connections occurs where the sub-
stantive labor law shapes the applicable law of lawyering. For exam-
ple, twentieth century labor law created legal personality for unions.
The existence of legal personality favors representing the union as an
entity. Absent legal personality, a union might very well receive rep-
resentation as a collection of individuals rather than as an
organization. 160
A similar influence results from the description of the duty of fair
representation as creating a fiduciary relationship between union and
bargaining unit member. This description has led to a partial waiver
155. Montplaiser, 875 F.2d at 6-7; Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259.
156. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
157. Montplaisir, 875 F.2d at 6-7; Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1259.
158. See supra Part III.B.2.(a).
159. See II THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW supra note 3, at 1450.
160. Although representation as an entity is available even for unincorporated groups,
see generally Stephen Ellman, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1103 (1992) (discussing the conflict between individual autonomy and group partici-
pation in legal representation of groups), court determinations that unions were only col-
lections of individuals would probably have determined the legal ethics characterization of
union representation. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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of the attorney-client privilege in duty of fair representation suits
against unions.' 6' It also provides the basis for future arguments for
disqualification of union attorneys. 62
Perhaps the most pervasive and reciprocal connections of the in-
terlaced threads of labor law and legal ethics relate to influence of the
clienthood determination on labor law's construction of a union's
function as a collectivity. Indeed, it influences the relationship be-
tween the union and bargaining unit member in ways that implicate
the policies underlying the duty of fair representation, including the
proper allocation of authority between individual and collectivity, as
well as the union's discretion and effectiveness in relations with man-
agement. If the union lawyer represents only the union, and bargain-
ing unit members have no significant claim on the lawyer, legal
representation provides a valuable resource for union leadership and
promotes the power of the union as a collective.
Any other alternative undermines these goals to some degree.
Recognizing the bargaining unit member as a client limits the author-
ity and flexibility of the union with regard to the relations with man-
agement, as well as with bargaining unit members. The law of
lawyering would make the union employing a lawyer function in the
area of contract administration as a collection of individuals-some of
whom are not even union members-rather than as a collectivity.
Viewing the bargaining unit member as a separate client deprives the
union of the ability to control grievances unilaterally and reduces the
union's ability to promote the interests of the majority in relations
with management. 163 It also diminishes union resources by disqualify-
ing lawyers who represent the union in a grievance from defending the
union in a duty of fair representation suit, and perhaps requiring the
union to pay for a separate lawyer for the bargaining member in con-
flict situations. 6 Of course, to avoid functioning as a collection of
individuals, the union could use nonlawyers who are not bound by
conflicts rules. 65 This solution would deprive unions of access to law-
yers' expertise in the grievance process and would place them at a
disadvantage compared to employers who face no such restriction.
161. See supra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
163. Pope, supra note 1, at 16 ("To win against the employer, the union must adopt a
unified strategy. Much of the art of union leadership consists of maintaining solidarity in
the face of potential division.")
164. See supra Part III.B.2.(b).
165. See supra Part III.B.2(b).
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The derivative client approach has a lesser, but still substantial,
influence on union relations with bargaining unit members and man-
agement. Unlike representation of the bargaining unit member as a
separate client, the derivative client approach does not deprive the
union of representation as an organization. At the same time, by
strengthening the claims of the individual against the collectivity, it
reduces the union's ability to use its legal resources to promote collec-
tive action. 16 6 In circumscribing the attorney-client privilege, the de-
rivative approach chills the incentive of unions to confide in lawyers
and therefore obtain the full benefit of legal advice. It also potentially
diminishes resources by affording an argument for disqualification. In
addition, it places the lawyer in the position of policing the client more
than a lawyer otherwise would. This policing raises the danger of law-
yers claiming authority properly belonging to union leaders. 67 Often
enhancing this danger is a "professional and cultural" divide between
union lawyers and union leaders. 68
.Consideration of the derivative approach also reveals that the fi-
duciary understanding of the duty of fair representation conflicts at
least in part with the lawyer immunity doctrine. Based on the fiduci-
ary understanding, the derivative approach could create liability for a
union lawyer who assists, or fails to prevent, a union's breach of the
duty of fair representation. 69 Although such liability contravenes
lawyer immunity, it does not wholly contravene the rationales for law-
yer immunity. One rationale is preventing liability under a negligence
standard because such a standard is lower than the standard required
for a breach of the duty of fair representation. 7° Lawyer liability for
assisting or permitting breaches would not conflict with this rationale.
However, it would conflict with the broader rationales that potential
personal liability for any union official or agent chills union activity,
and that potential personal liability-for lawyers in particular-dis-
courages unions from employing lawyers and lawyers from represent-
ing unions. 7'
How to resolve the conflict between lawyer immunity and the fi-
duciary nature of the duty of fair representation, whether by prefer-
ring or compromising one of these doctrines, presents a difficult issue
implicating both labor law and legal ethics considerations. But the
166. Pope, supra note 1, at 16.
167. Id. at 11-12, 29.
168. Id. at 29.
169. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
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purpose of identifying this issue is not to resolve it. Rather, it is to
demonstrate the efficacy of the model of interlaced threads in expos-
ing an issue which courts and commentators appear to have
overlooked.
The model of interlaced threads further helps analyze two legal
ethics questions which do not fit easily within the entity, separate cli-
ent, or derivative approaches.172 The first suggests a narrow area of
potential lawyer liability beyond breaches of the duty of fair represen-
tation. Assuming the union has instructed the lawyer to advocate
zealously on behalf of an individual grievance, 173 the lawyer commits
malpractice, and the union refuses to sue for malpractice, why
shouldn't the law permit the bargaining unit member to sue? 174 The
availability of such a suit could provide a significant remedy to an in-
dividual who may have suffered an extremely serious harm, such as
the loss of a secure, well-paying job.
On its face, such a suit would seem consistent with respecting the
union's collective authority. After all, the union instructed the lawyer
to advocate zealously. But the union's interests may be more com-
plex. The union may have considered suing the lawyer and decided
that its long term relationship with the union lawyer was more impor-
tant to the collective than the individual grievance.175 Accordingly,
even consideration of this narrow area of lawyer liability implicates
the range of questions regarding the proper distribution of authority
between individual and collective under substantive labor law.
The second issue which does not clearly fall within the paradigms
of group, individual, and derivative representation, but demonstrates
the interconnection between legal ethics and substantive law, is the
claim that union lawyers have an obligation to the good of the union
as a whole separate from the instructions of union leadership.176 One
goal of labor law is the democratic governance of unions.' 77 This sug-
172. This claim turns on a construction of a union's obligation to bargaining unit mem-
bers which could fit within alternative or supplemental versions of the entity or derivative
models.
173. This removes the issue of the union's authority to control the grievance. See supra
Part II.B.
174. I would like to thank Ted Schneyer for bringing this question to my attention.
175. The union's reasons could also be less sympathetic, such as its own negligence or a
cozy friendship between union leaders and the lawyer.
176. One could make this argument as an alternative or supplementary version of the
entity or derivative models.
177. Pope, supra note 1, at 29. The law seeks to promote "full and active participation
by the rank and file in the affairs of the union." American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein,
379 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1964). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 481 (1994).
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gests an analogy to government lawyers where many have argued that
the lawyer properly represents the electorate, or the "people," as op-
posed to government officials."'8 Professor James Gray Pope has
made a similar claim with regard to union lawyers.' 7 9 He argues that
while a union lawyer should generally follow the instructions of union
leaders in dealing with management, she should protect the demo-
cratic process of the union in internal union disputes.'80 In the event
of "violations of or malfunctions in the union's democratic processes,
... union lawyers should take action whenever the leadership is plan-
ning or engaging in activities that could, if members had access to all
the facts, give rise to a legal challenge with a reasonable likelihood of
success."'
181
Professor Pope does not fully analyze the implications of his ap-
proach for grievance arbitrations. He suggests that union leaders have
"no structural conflict of interest" with members and "nothing to gain
from.., negligent grievance processing."' 82 He would treat grievance
processing as a democratic process violation only where "unfair treat-
ment is politically motivated.' 83 The determination of whether the
treatment is unfair and politically motivated, and the authority to act
in such circumstances raises some of the same difficulties for the dis-
tribution of authority between union and lawyer, and the power of the
union as a collective, as derivative representation." 8 Therefore, in its
178. See, e.g., William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government
Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are In Conflict?, 29 HOWARD L.J. 539
(1986) (discussing competing approaches to government representation). In addition,
some commentators have argued that all lawyers for large, powerful organizations, such as
corporations, have a broad duty to the public good. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 148, at
256; William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
179. Pope, supra note 1, at 37-38. Pope relies more on commentators suggesting a
general duty to the public interest, rather than on the analogy to the government lawyer,
which his article does not explore in depth.
180. Id. at 54.
181. Id. Stephen Ellman makes a similar argument with regard to group representa-
tion generally. Ellman, supra note 160, at 1103.
182. Pope, supra note 1, at 47. However, as this Article suggests, the conflicts of inter-
est may be structural and the union's motivations may be more complex. See supra notes
26-28 and accompanying text, as well as Part III.B.2.b.
183. Pope, supra note 1, at 48.
184. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. These difficulties could be even
greater under other applications of the analogy of government lawyering to union repre-
sentation. Professor Pope's suggestion is narrow compared to a claim that in all circum-
stances the union lawyer has an obligation to represent what is right for the "people" or
the bargaining unit, despite the instructions of union leaders. Such an approach would tilt
the balance of authority even further toward the lawyer. Indeed, as William Josephson and
I warned in an earlier article on the analogous context of government representation, the
public representation approach poses the danger of "a government of lawyers, not of
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effect, as well as in its derivation, 185 the democratic governance ap-
proach implicates'the allocation of authority between the individual
and collective.
Consideration of the democratic governance approach again illus-
trates how determination of the appropriate role of union lawyers is
interconnected with the substantive law. As with the entity, separate
client, and derivative models, or the narrow malpractice exception dis-
cussed above, the democratic governance model demonstrates that
the law of lawyering and substantive labor law have many connections
and influence each other reciprocally. All of these analyses indicate
that contrary to the intersecting circles approach, any effort to deter-
mine the appropriate labor law or role for union lawyers must take
both legal ethics and labor law into account.
V. CONCLUSION
Examination of the union lawyer's duties to bargaining unit mem-
bers demonstrates that labor law and legal ethics are better under-
stood as interlaced threads, rather than intersecting circles. This case
study supports Judge Sharswood's view that legal ethics define, and
are defined by, the nature of our society.'86 If Sharswood's under-
standing proves to have general applicability, we may conclude that
legal ethics and substantive law form a seamless web, such that knowl-
edge of one is not complete without knowledge of the other.
laws." Josephson & Pearce, supra note 178, at 569. Here, the danger would be of bargain-
ing unit representation by lawyers as opposed to their elected representatives.
185. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
186. Pearce, supra note 139, at 282.
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